

DOE Role in Fukushima Response



Frank Moore
Aug 10, 2012



Statement of Problem



- Occurred 14:46 March 11, 2011
- Magnitude: 9.0 Mw
- Epicenter location: 38° 6" N and 142° 51" E, and 24km in depth
- It is said that the height of tsunami attacked Fukushima NPP was more than 14m

Source: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)




Overview of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant

- 6 Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) plants
 - Fuel Type – UO_2 (MOX Unit 3)
 - Output (MWe)
 - Unit 1: 460
 - Unit 2-5: 784
 - Unit 6: 1,100
- Years of commercial operation: ~32-38
- Plant status on March 11
 - Unit 1–3: In operation since Fall 2010
 - Unit 4-6: Refueling Outage

Spent Fuel Pools	1	2	3	4	5	6
# of Spent Fuel Assemblies	292	587	514	1331	946	876
# of New Fuel Assemblies	100	28	52	204	48	64
Water Volume (m ³)	1,020	1,425	1,425	1,425	1,425	1,497




Mark I Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)



Root Cause of Damage

- The ~14 m Tsunami was ~ 9 m greater than the site design basis height of 5.4 m.
- The water completely inundated Units 1-4 knocking out diesel generators, leading to a 'station blackout sequence.'










- After batteries ran dry, loss of core cooling led to coolant boil-down, uncovered fuel, decay heat buildup and fuel-rod degradation. Due to the lack of heat sink, the containments pressurized and **venting commenced**
- Zr cladding oxidation from exposed fuel lead to H₂ release that apparently found its way into the reactor buildings
- **Explosions (most likely H₂ detonations) in Units 1 and 3** occurred on 3/12 and 3/14, damaging the reactor building upper structure (not containment boundary).
- During these events, site personnel also struggled to keep the spent fuel pool ponds covered with water, particularly for Unit 4 that contained a full core off-load
 - **Explosion at unit 4 on 3/14, presumably H₂ detonation**
- Contaminated water leaks and deliberate water releases to ocean mid- to late March
- Multiple release scenarios and pathways to the environment





Radionuclides of Primary Concern

Revised April 2003

Nuclear Power Plant Accident

Plume Phase

^{88}Kr , ^{133}Xe , ^{135}Xe
 ^{131}I , ^{132}I , ^{133}I , ^{135}I
 $^{131\text{m}}\text{Te}$, ^{132}Te , ^{129}Sb

First Year

^{131}I , ^{132}Te
 ^{134}Cs , ^{136}Cs , ^{137}Cs
 ^{103}Ru , ^{106}Ru
 ^{140}Ba , ^{140}La
 ^{95}Nb , ^{95}Zr
 ^{141}Ce , ^{144}Ce
 ^{238}Pu , ^{241}Pu

Radionuclides Observed

I-131 8.02 days

I-132 2.3 hours

Te-132 3.2 days

I-133 20.8 hours

Te-129m 33.6 days

Cs-134 2.07 years

Cs-136 13.04 days

Cs-137 30.03 years

La-140 1.7 days


Public Protection Measures

- March 12: Government of Japan established mandatory evacuation zone for people living within a 20 km radius of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP and recommended shelter-in-place for people living within 20-30 km
- March 13: US Embassy issued an advisory restricting travel US citizens within 80 km of the Fukushima NPP
- March 16: US Embassy and US Forces Japan (USFJ) authorized voluntary departure for dependents

DOE Support to Operation Tomodachi

Mission:

Assess the consequences of releases from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP)



Initial DOE Deployment

- March 14, 2011
 - At White House direction, DOE deployed a tailored CMRT and AMS capability via military airlift (C-17) to Yokota Air Base



DOE Timeline (cont'd)

- March 16
 - CM Assets arrive at Yokota AB and fly first AMS test flight
- March 17
 - First aerial measurement activities over plant conducted; first field monitoring mission completed
- March 22
 - Initial data published on DOE website




Argonne Deployments

- Frank Moore and Steve Bettenhausen deployed April 5th thru April 29th
- Dave Chamberlain deployed April 19th thru May 6th
- Ray Klann deployed May 4th thru May 16th





Yokota AFB – 145 miles to Reactors





U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY

Yokota Air Base



04/05/2011 09:02

Hangar 1503:
DOE's home at
Yokota AB



Tent in
background is
AFRAT's lab



Field Team

Composition

- Small field footprint with large capability
- 33 personnel to Yokota AB
 - 12 scientists of many disciplines (nuclear, GIS, environmental, 5 PhDs, 2 CHPs)
 - Technicians with a diverse skill set
- 1 DOE HQ liaison to US embassy, Tokyo



AERIAL MEASURING SYSTEM ACTIVITIES



Aerial Monitoring

What was done

- Fixed wing and helicopter
- Up to 3 aircraft per day
- Surveys over US bases
- Joint DOE & GOJ survey



Why it was done

- Map ground deposition out to 80 km from FDNPP
- Support evacuation, relocation, agricultural decisions


AMS on USAF Aircraft



Typical flight path




AMS Altitude Correction



- Nominal flying altitude (H_{AGL}) of 500ft (UH-1) or 1000ft (C-12)
- Line spacing $2x H_{AGL}$
- Actual height above ground level (AGL) derived from GPS altitude and Japan Digital Elevation Model (DEM)
 - $H_{AGL} = H_{GPS} - H_{DEM}$
- Measured gamma exposure-rate readings corrected to 1 meter above the ground using H_{AGL}
 - $R_{1m} = R_{H_{AGL}} e^{\mathbf{u}H_{AGL}}$
- Average exposure-rate attenuation coefficient \mathbf{u} determined empirically from calibrated flight line in the US
- Corrected exposure rate “calibrated” by ground-level measurements by field monitoring teams


Typical Results

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
Aerial Monitoring Results
 UH-1 Flight (April 10, 2011) **FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI JAPAN**




Map created on 04112011 2320 JST
 Name: NIT UH-1 Results 10Apr2011
UNCLASSIFIED
 Nuclear Incident Team DOE NIT
 Contact (202) 586 - 8100

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
Aerial Monitoring Results
 C-12 Flight (April 10, 2011) **FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI JAPAN**



Map created on 04102011 1845 JST
 Name: NIT C-12 Results 10Apr2011
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 Contact (202) 586 - 8100


Composite Results





Interpolated Exposure Rate Map






 **Aerial Monitoring Results** **FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI**
April 06-18, 2011 **JAPAN**



Time-Sequenced Exposure Rate

Aerial Monitoring Survey Areas Overview of Aerial Monitoring Contoured Results (3/17 - 04/29/2011)

FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI
 JAPAN



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Aerial Data (3/17 - 4/29/2011)
 Exposure Rate at 1 Meter

- > 12.5 mR/hr
- 2.17 - 12.5 mR/hr
- 1.19 - 2.17 mR/hr
- 0.25 - 1.19 mR/hr
- 0.03 - 0.25 mR/hr
- < 0.03 mR/hr

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Kilometers
 0 10 20 30 40 Miles


Nuclear Incident Team DOE NIT
 Contact (202) 586 - 8100

This map was produced by the Geographic Information Systems department of NNSA's Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) at Nellis AFB, Las Vegas, Nevada. ESRI World Street Map and CMHT databases were used for map generation.

RSL map identification number is:
 AHS ComplianceResults 0317_0429 StreetMap 04/29/2011.mxd




Sea Water Release



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


Gamma-Spec Isotopic Extraction




$$Cs-137(3win) = \sum_{E=596}^{728} S(E) - k * \left[\sum_{E=530}^{596} S(E) + \sum_{E=728}^{794} S(E) \right]$$

$$k = \sum_{E=596}^{728} S_{ref}(E) / \left[\sum_{E=530}^{596} S_{ref}(E) + \sum_{E=728}^{794} S_{ref}(E) \right]$$





Gamma-Spec Isotopic Extraction



Uncertainties for AMS Measurements

- Altitude and atmospheric pressure corrections
- Attenuation through aircraft skin
- Radon and cosmic-ray contributions
- Short-scale spatial variations in activity distribution (hotspots)
- Positional
 - GPS
 - Velocity along flight direction
- Detector response
- Ground-based corrections



Ground monitoring

What was done


- Mobile monitoring
- In-situ measurements
- Exposure rate measurements
- Air sampling
- Soil samples/core samples
- Swipes


Why it was done

- Calibrate aerial measurements
- Define Isotopic mix
- Characterize the inhalation component of integrated dose
- Assess vertical and horizontal migration of deposited material




Mobile monitoring







Monitoring Results: Sendai to Tokyo



Note: 1 milliRem (mRem) = 10 microSieverts;
1 milliRem (mRem) = 1000 microrem

Exposure rate measurements



Air sampling






U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

ENERGY *In Situ* HPGe Measurements




- Mechanically cooled HPGe
- 15% Relative Efficiency p-type
- 1 meter above surface









- 3 Days prior to Sec. Clinton visit
- Concern for Embassy Personnel

Spectrum Comparison



In Situ Spectra




Uncertainties for *In Situ* Measurements

- Infinite plane, uniform deposition assumption
 - Surface roughness
 - Nearby obstructions
 - Deposition on grass and vegetation
- Surface deposition vs. permeation into ground
 - Exponential or uniform depth profile
 - Attenuation through ground
 - Soil and core samples
- Angular response of detector
 - Calibrated pads
 - Point source characterizations
 - Mathematical models (MCNP)



HPGe Results – Normalized to Cs-137




Projected Dose Estimates




Aerial Measuring Results

Joint US/Japan Survey Data

FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI
JAPAN



Expanded Japanese Evacuation Zones



- Announced by GOJ around April 20th
- Effective May 1
- Based in large part on U.S. AMS and ground monitoring data



Soil sampling






Core Sampling



Total Sr Analysis



MDA



Sandia National
Laboratories

3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89

Slide 14

Challenges:

- Sr-89/90 Analysis is time consuming, it requires several days to allow ingrowth as part of the analysis process.
- Activity on these samples was near detection levels and as a result the Sr to Cs ratios varied widely from 1:1 to 2000:1. The fact that they were all near detection level seemed to be causing this variability.

Monitoring Challenges




Roads to Nowhere?



Access Issues



Inclement Weather



Public Areas




Uncooperative Equipment



Sample Counting in Contaminated Environment

- Air filter, swipe, and soil samples
 - Lines from I-131, Cs-134, Cs-137 present in background spectra
 - Background varied significantly in early days



Monitoring Opportunities



Gracious Locals



Beautiful Countryside




New Cuisine



Luxurious Office Space

Interesting Guests












Field Team Activity Successes

- DOE was able to perform on-the-fly analysis to deal with multiple ongoing releases, unknown source terms, challenging terrain as well as non-technical pressures.
- DOE Scientists developed customized products for U.S. military (data products, InField Monitoring System).
- DOE scientists embedded with Japanese scientists to create joint data products.

Response Personnel





End State

- USFJ and Government of Japan to continue monitoring activities as needed
 - Japanese trained & equipped to fly DOE AMS equipment
 - Japanese equipped with an enhanced laboratory analysis capability
 - USFJ trained & equipped to fly contingency AMS
 - DOE continues to support Japanese and USFJ from Home Team

Resilience following a nuclear catastrophe

Recent Japanese Data




Questions?



Some Sources of Information

- DOE Blog
 - <http://blog.energy.gov/content/situation-japan>
- ANS Nuclear Café
 - <http://ansnuclearcafe.org/>
 - Click on the Fukushima tab
- Areva Presentation
 - http://physics.harvard.edu/~wilson/AREVA_Fukushima.ppt
 - Or Google “Areva Braun Fukushima”
- “Nuclear Boy” video
 - <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5sakN2hSVxA>







USAF Oil-Cooler NDA Request




- Flight from Okinawa to Yokota
- Concern for ground crew safety
- Request for isotope ID and activity





I-131 (0.2 uCi), Cs-134,137 (0.8 uCi), Cs-136 (0.05 uCi)

HPGe Results – Normalized to Cs-137






Root Cause of Damage

Note:

- All operating units when earthquake occurred were automatically shut down.
- Emergency D/Gs have worked properly until the Tsunami attack.



Source: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)

